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Abstract
Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness (mËjh) is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as
compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic.1 In the Republic, Plato
maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e–399e, 3.403e, and
9.571c–573b), while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance
(1.635b, 1.645d–650a, and 2.665c–672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind,
and if he did, why?2 Ultimately, this paper answers afrmatively and argues that this marks a
substantive shift in Plato’s attitude towards anti-rational desires.3 More precisely, this paper
argues that in the Republic, Plato holds that anti-rational desires are always detrimental to health
and virtue, while in the Laws, Plato maintains that anti-rational desires can be instrumental to
health and virtue.
1. Intoxication in the Republic
There are three passages in the Republic in which Plato describes the ethical quality of
drunkenness. The rst passage occurs in Book 3 when Socrates is discussing the education
of the guardians. At 398e6-7, Socrates says, ‘Now, drunkenness (mËjh) is inappropriate
for the guardians, as is softness (malak–a) and idleness (Çrg–a).’ Following this, Socrates
objects to the use of the Lydian and Ionic musical harmonies4 in the education of the
guardians because they are soft (malaka–), lax (qalara–), and suitable for symposium
(3.398e–399a; see also 3.395e–396a). Hence, because these harmonies develop vicious
1 All translations are my own; however, for the Laws, I have relied on Pangle (1988) and Meyer (2015), and for
Plato’s other work, Cooper and Hutchinson (1997). The Greek for Plato’s work follows Burnet (1900–1907),
but with respect to the Laws, I have consulted des Places and Diès (1951–6). Translations of Aristotle’s Politics
are slighted modied from Jowett (1985), with the Greek from Ross (1957). My discussion of drunkenness
will be restricted to the Laws and the Republic. The obvious text that I am excluding from my discussion is
the Symposium. I am excluding this text for two reasons: (1) with some minor exceptions (see 176c–d), the
Symposium does not explicitly discuss the dangers and benets of intoxication; (2) the Symposium does not
involve the construction of a city, and thus the norms concerning intoxication discussed in the Symposium are
taking place under a different context from the Laws and the Republic.
2 The role of drunkenness in the Laws has been mostly neglected by scholars. For instance, Stalley (1983, 5)
remarks that ‘many readers have found this section tedious,’ while Post (1929, 16) holds that it is simply a device
to ‘entice the unsuspecting drunkard into hearing a sermon on temperance.’ The exceptions are Belore (1986),
North (1966, 191–2) and Wildberg (2011, 221–4). Belore offers the most thoughtful and interesting discussion
of drunkenness. However, I disagree with her analysis in many important respects which I will discuss in section
ve. North’s and Wildberg’s discussion is useful, but brief.
3 By ‘anti-rational desires,’ I do not mean non-rational. Instead, I mean opposed to reason; that is, desires that
reason does not sanction. I will discuss this in more detail in section ve.
4 The usual translation is ‘mode,’ however, I am convinced by Woerther (2008, 91n11) that ‘harmony’ is a better
translation.
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constitutions, they will be forbidden from the guardians’ education. Instead, the guardians
will only hear musical harmonies that encourage courage and temperance (3.399a–e).5
This passage demonstrates that Plato associates intoxication with harmful dispositions,
such as cowardice, laziness, and intemperance.
The second passage occurs in Book 3 when Socrates and Glaucon discuss the physical
training of the young guardians:
Soc.: We said that our prospective guardians must avoid drunkenness, for it is less appropriate
for a guardian to be drunk and not to know where on earth he is than it is for anyone else.
Glau.: It would be absurd for a guardian to need a guardian (3.403e4-7).
Although this passage is making reference back to the discussion of intoxication at 3.398e,
the reasons raised against drunkenness are different. At 3.398e, Plato objects to drunkenness
on the grounds that it will hinder the development of a virtuous soul, while at 3.403e, the
reasons against intoxication have to do with responsibility. The guardians are supposed to
protect the city and they will not be able to fulll this duty if they are drunk.
The third passage occurs in Book 9 when Socrates discusses the nature of the tyrannical
soul. Socrates compares the soul of a tyrant to that of a soul during drunken sleep. Socrates
warns that ‘drunken sleep awakens the bestial and savage part in us,’ which seeks to
‘satisfy its own instincts’ (9.571c4-7). In such a condition, ‘nothing is too outrageous,
being unfastened and delivered from all sense of shame (Çnaisqunt–ac) and prudence’
(9.571c7-d2). During drunken sleep one’s erotic desires run wild – seeking anyone, be
it one’s own mother, man, beast, or god; additionally, one is prone to violent outbursts,
gluttony, and all sorts of foolish behavior (9.571c–d). In contrast, during sober and healthy
sleep, reason is in control, and as a result one’s sleep will likely be peaceful and lawful
(9.571d–572b).
This passage continues with Socrates explaining how the tyrant’s soul is similar to the
soul of a drunk. The tyrannical soul develops when erotic desires, ‘like a great winged
drone,’ become the leader of the soul’s desires (9.573a1-2; see also 5.475a). Then, ‘other
desires – lled with incense, myrrh, wreaths, wine, and the other pleasures found in
their company – buzz around the drone,’ they nurture it and make it grow as large as
possible (9.573a4-8). Following this, the drone adopts ‘madness as its bodyguard’ and
if it nds any reasonable beliefs or desires, ‘it destroys them and throws them out, until
it has purged him of moderation and lled him with imported madness’ (9.573a8-b4).
This leads Socrates to conclude that one becomes a tyrant to the fullest extent when one
combines the characteristics of ‘drunkenness (mejustikÏc), lust (‚rwtik‰c), and madness
(melagqolikÏc)’ (9.573c9; see also Phaedrus 238b, 256c).
These three passages make it clear that Plato’s attitude towards intoxication in the
Republic is negative.6 Let us now turn to Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness in the Laws.
In the next section I examine Plato’s discussion of drunkenness in Laws 1; following this I
examine it in Laws 2.
5 At 3.399a, Socrates says that he does not know what musical harmonies have this quality, but 3.399c sug-
gests that Plato believes the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies have these qualities; see Aristotle Politics
8.7.1342a30-1342b15.
6 Plato, however, does maintain that there will be drinking wine in the so called ‘city of pigs’ (3.372a–b); neverthe-
less, Glaucon objects to the city of pigs on the grounds that it is lacks the goods related to symposium (3.372e).
Hence, it seems unlikely that drunkenness occurs in the city of pigs; see also 4.426a–b.
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2. Laws 1: Wine as Testing and Training
Books 1 and 2 of the Laws are largely about ‘musical’ education.7 The Athenian Stranger
is critical of the Cretan and Spartan educational systems. The Athenian argues that their
method of education is ill-equipped to develop virtue in their citizens – including the
virtue of courage, which Megillus and Clinias value over every other virtue.8 According to
the Athenian, not only does courage ‘combat against fears and pains,’ but it also guards
against ‘longings (pÏjouc) and pleasures, and certain terrible seductive atteries (deinÄc
jwpe–ac kolakikàc) that can melt the spiritedness (toÃc jumoÃc) even of those who think
themselves highly dignied’ (1.633c8-d3). This is problematic for the citizens of both
Crete and Sparta because, according to Megillus and Clinias, they only train in resisting
pain and fear, but do nothing to combat pleasure and longings (1.635b–d).
The Stranger remarks that there is something puzzling about the Cretans’ and Spartans’
educational system. On the one hand, the Spartans’ and Cretans’ lawgiver maintains that
their citizens should ‘keep away from and not taste the greatest sorts of pleasure and play’
(1.635b5-6). On the other hand, ‘as to pains and fears’ the lawgiver maintains ‘that if
someone ees them, from childhood until the end of life, the result will be that when he
does encounter hardships, fears, and pains that are unavoidable, he will ee before those
who have had training in such things and will be enslaved by them’ (1.635b6-c3). The
Athenian wonders why the same lawgiver did not think the same thing about training in
pleasure as he did about training in pain. The lawgiver should have said to himself:
If our citizens grow up from youth lacking experience in the greatest pleasures, if they aren’t
practiced in enduring pleasures and in never being compelled to do anything shameful (ÇmelËthtoi
gignÏmenoi ‚n taÿc ôdonaÿc kartereÿn ka» mhd‡n t¿n a sqr¿n Çnagkàzesjai poieÿn), their soft-
ness of spirit (glukujum–ac) before pleasures will lead them to suffer the same thing as those who
are overcome by fears. They will be enslaved in another and more shameful fashion to those who
are capable of enduring pleasures, who have experienced pleasures (toÿc ge dunamËnoic kartereÿn
‚n taÿc ôdonaÿc ka» toÿc kekthmËnoic tÄ per» tÄc ôdonàc), and who are sometimes human beings
vicious in every way. They’ll have souls that are part slave and part free, and will not be worthy of
being called courageous and free men without qualication (1.635c5-d5).
Clinias and Megillus, however, are quite wary about the advantages of training in
pleasure. Accordingly, the Athenian proposes that they look at the virtue of temperance
(swfros‘nh) and examine how training in pleasure can aid in cultivating temperance. This
leads the Athenian to inquire into Sparta’s and Crete’s method for developing temper-
ance. Unfortunately, Megillus does not know how Sparta trains their citizens to develop
temperance, but he suggests that it is likely developed in their practice of gymnastics and
common meals (1.636a).9 Awkwardly, the Athenian condemns this practice, arguing that
it is the cause of unnatural sexual behaviors in Sparta and Crete (1.636b–e).10 Although
7
Mousik† was a broad category for the Ancient Greeks, which included rhythm, harmony, and discourses (lÏgoi).
8 For instance, in Book 1 Cleinias and Megillus argue that governments exist to win wars and thus the primary
virtue that governments should develop is courage (1.625c ff.).
9 The common meals were essentially an all-male club with a military emphasis; see Morrow (1960, 389–98). In
the Politics 2.9.1271a30-10.1272a20, Aristotle notes that the Spartans developed their practice from the Cretans.
For a discussion of the connection of common meals and gymnastics with pederasty see Percy (1996).
10 The Athenian points out that all Greeks accuse the Cretans of being the originators of the myth of Ganymede,
which is the model for the Greek practice of pederasty (1.636d; see also 8.836c–839d). Plato’s attitude towards
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Megillus is uncertain of how to respond, he ultimately defends the Spartan practice of
evading pleasure (I.636e) – boasting that in his opinion ‘the ways of Sparta with regard to
pleasures are the nest in all the world’ (1.636e8-a2). Megillus explains that Spartans do
not host any drinking parties and that drunkenness is so disparaged that Spartans would
beat any drunkard they came across, even during the festival of Dionysus (1.637a–b).11
The Athenian, however, is not impressed with these Spartan practices. He argues that
under the appropriate conditions inxtoxication is benecial.12 The Athenian explains that
drinking wine intensies ‘pleasures and pains and the spirited (jumoÃc) and erotic emotions
(Írwtac)’ (1.645d6-8), while dulling ‘sense perceptions (a sj†seic), memories, beliefs,
and prudent thoughts (fron†seic)’ (1.645e1-2). Intoxication thus renders you in a child-
like condition in which you have little self-control (1.645e–646a); as a result you are
bolder, more talkative, more condent, more hopeful, more joyful, more fearless, and more
shameless (1.649a–d, 2.666c–d, 2.671b–c; cf. Cratylus 406-c).13 If this condition were
permanent it would be awful, but because it is only temporary, it can be used medicinally
to strengthen the soul. This is similar to taking purgative medicine or engaging in vigorous
exercise; both practices strengthen the body by rst temporarily weakening it (1.646c; cf.
Republic 2.382a–e, 3.389a–e). Drunkenness works in a similar manner: the wine temporar-
ily weakens the soul by putting it in a base condition; nevertheless, this experience can
ultimately strengthen the soul by producing ‘shame’ (a d∏c) in it, which is a precondition
for virtue (1.647a–b).14
pederasty in the Laws seems to differ from his attitude in the Symposium and the Phaedrus (cf. Republic 5.458c–
d). It should also be noted that part of the Athenian’s criticism of common meals is that the Spartans and the
Cretans are only concerned with making their citizens good at war and are not concerned with the virtues
that come about during peace and leisure (see 1.625e, 2.633a, and 6.780b). Plato wants to extend the practice
of common meals to women (6.780e–781d) and for the focus to be not only on the preparation for war, but
communion with fellow citizens; see Pangle 1988, 379; Aristotle, Politics 2.12.1274b10-15.
11 Both the Spartans and Cretans were notoriously abstemious and restrained wine drinkers (see Minos 320a). For
instance, the Helots were the only people allowed to get drunk in Sparta. The adult Spartans forced the Helots to
get incapacitatingly drunk to show the Spartan youth how not to behave; see Cartledge 2004, 98.
Morrow (1960, 371n255) explains that during the festival of Dionysus, a cart carrying the god was followed by
wagons with raucous riders shouting insults and obnoxious things at one another and the crowd. This is likely
what Megillus is complaining about at 1.637a–b.
12 The Athenian is quite explicit that he is not merely talking about the value of drinking wine, but the value in
getting drunk (1.637d; 2.671a; see Belore 1986, 430n29). Some scholars have argued that this is not the case. For
instance, England (1921, ad loc. 1.637d4) advises, ‘We must remember that the Greeks drank nothing stronger
than wine, and nearly always drank that mixed with water, and hence the word m‡jh had not the disgusting
connotation that its equivalent has among us,’ while Stalley (1983, 124) writes that symposiasts are only ‘mildly
intoxicated.’ However, these accounts cannot explain why the Athenian would describe drunkenness as causing
the effects that it does (see especially 1.645d–e).
13 There is a difcult interpretative question lingering here: How can exciting spirited emotions make one more
shameless? This is puzzling because spirited emotions, such as anger, are associated with having a sense of
shame. Accordingly, it would seem that exciting one’s spirit, would excite one’s sense of shame and honor. I do
not have the space to address this question in detail, but I suspect that Plato has in mind a situation in which one’s
anger makes them lose sight of what is appropriate and inappropriate from an objective perspective. Consider
Achilles whose anger does not appear to be responsive to a sense of shame, see especially, Iliad 24.30-50; cf.
24.503; see Hobbs 2000, chap. 7.
14 There is an interesting question as to whether this means that Plato is abandoning the principle that ‘like causes
like,’ see Phaedo 68d, 68e, 100a–b; Parmenides 131c–d; Republic 1.335c–d; Protagoras 355d; and Theaetetus
199d.
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The Athenian explains how drunkenness develops a sense of shame (a d∏c) by dis-
tinguishing between two types of fear. On the one hand, there is the fear of expecting an
evil, such as pain or death (1.646e). The fear of pain or death is dangerous because it can
prevent individuals from acting courageously in battle (1.647b–c). Because of this, it is
vital that individuals are trained to develop immunity to this kind of fear. This takes the
form of exposing citizens to the things that they should be fearless of; the idea being that
with practice, citizens will learn to endure the ‘evils’ that they nd fearful. The Spartan
and Cretan educational system focuses on this kind of fear (1.633b–d).
On the other hand, there is the fear of doing something dishonorable, especially in the
presence of someone noble; this kind of fear is called ‘shame’ (a d∏c) (1.646e–647b).
Shame is a good type of fear because when individuals have shame they are not only
able to resist suffering and pain, but they are able to endure the greatest pleasures as
well (1.647a).15 The idea is that when you confront something that frightens you, or an
extreme amount of pleasure, out of fear of being viewed a disgrace by someone noble, you
will not ee from pursuing excellence. Therefore, it might be appropriate to call shame a
precondition for virtue because its existence aids in producing courage, temperance, and
justice (1.647a–b). Now, just as citizens develop fearlessness of expecting pain by being
exposed to and overcoming that which they think is painful, citizens develop the fear that
is shame (a d∏c) by being exposed to and overcoming pleasures that seduce them into
acting shamelessly and unjustly (1.647c–e).16
Properly supervised drinking parties provide an inexpensive and safe way to cultivate
and test shame (1.649c–650a). In a state of drunkenness, you become more cheerful,
more fearless, and less controlled (1.649b). As a result, you will become more tempted to
shamelessly pursue pleasure. Putting individuals in this condition provides them with an
opportunity to develop shame in much the same way that being exposed to pain and fear
develops courage and fearlessness: just as one learns to overcome pain and fear by being
exposed to it, one will learn to overcome the temptation of pleasure and shamelessness by
being exposed to them as well (1.649c). Additionally, if a symposiast acts inappropriately
there is no great danger (1.649d–650b) because a wise, sober, and elderly symposiarch is
leading the symposium (1.640d, 2.671d, and 2.672a).17
Furthermore, this practice provides the city with the knowledge of who has a sense of
shame and thus can resist pleasure, and who is shameless and thus cannot resist pleasure,
which is some of the most useful knowledge that the city can acquire (1.650b). In other
15 This is why at 1.647b–c the Athenian says that ‘each of us must be at the same time fearless and fearful.’
16 Pangle (1988, 518n55) points out that in Plutarch’s Cleomenes IX it is noted that the Spartans have a positive
attitude towards fear; they hold that it is not something that should always be avoided, but rather should be
cultivated in certain ways. For instance, the Spartans believed that fear had the power to hold a regime together;
cf. Euthyphro 12b. This is why the Spartans constructed temples to Phobos (Fear) and his twin brother Deimos
(Terror). This suggests that the Athenian might be trying to persuade Megillus that drunkenness is valuable by
showing him how it can cultivate something that his own culture values. One should also keep in mind that
Dionysus is the god of battle panic; see Euripides’ Bacchae 302–5 cited by Belore 1986, 436.
17 At 1.648d the Athenian suggests that people might practice drunkenness while alone. However, as Belore (1983,
424n13) explains there is no contradiction for Plato ‘to allow solitary, unsupervised drinking but to require a
symposiarch to rule groups of drinkers.’ Drinking parties are also restricted to certain individuals (2.666a–b) and
to the festival of Dionysus (6.775b). This shall be discussed in more detail in the next section.
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words, there is a kind of honesty that comes from intoxication, in this state, you reveal
your true character (see also Symposium 217e; Protagoras 347c–e).
From the Athenian’s discussion in Book 1, we can identify two benets of drunkenness:
(1) it is a safe and inexpensive device for testing one’s sense of shame, and (2) it provides
a means by which one can train in the resistance of pleasure and thereby develop a sense
of shame. Let us turn to the Stranger’s discussion of intoxication in Book 2.
3. Laws 2: Pleasure, Motivation, and Evaluative Judgements
The Athenian insists that drinking parties are only benecial under certain conditions.
There are four conditions that matter most: (1) there needs to be a wise, sober, and elderly
symposiarch (2.672a), (2) there are strict age restrictions on the symposium (2.666a–b), (3)
those who engage in a symposium are not on duty (2.647a–b),18 and (4) the symposium is
restricted to the festival of Dionysus (6.775b).19 For the purposes of this section, it is only
necessary to focus on the age restrictions of the symposium.
The Athenian maintains that citizens are forbidden to drink wine until the age of eighteen
(2.666a).20 After the age of eighteen, citizens will be permitted to drink and taste wine
in moderation (2.666a). However, only those nearing the age of forty and older will be
allowed to engage in drunkenness (2.666a–b).21 These ages are not arbitrarily selected, but
are grounded in the Athenian’s understanding of education and moral psychology.
According to the Stranger, all children are ery (diàpuroc) by nature, which in turn,
makes them eager to move and sing, and incapable of remaining calm (2.653d–e, 2.664e,
2.666a, 2.671b–c, and 2.672c). In contrast, adults are reluctant to sing and dance because
they no longer nd such activities pleasurable, but consider them shameful:
Everyone as he grows older becomes apprehensive about singing, and takes less pleasure in doing
this, and when he is forced to sing, he feels ashamed (a sq‘noit+). The more elderly and temperate
(swfronËsteroc) that he gets, the more this increases . . . Surely, then, he would feel even more
ashamed (a sq‘noit+) if he sang in the theater, before all kinds of people (2.665d9-e6).22
18 For instance, the Athenian forbids the following from drinking: female and male slaves; magistrates during the
year in which they serve; pilots, soldiers, and judges while performing their services; and anyone in an important
council meeting (2.674a–b).
19 The Athenian is particularly concerned about individuals getting drunk during their wedding reception. He is
concerned that this will ruin one’s ability to procreate or affect the development of the fetus (6.775b–775e). The
text indicates that the symposium is not restricted to men, but women will be allowed their own symposium (see.
8.828c).
20 One might worry that this suggests that drunkenness is not crucial to learning self-control, or that one cannot
develop self-control until adulthood. However, as I explain below, this is not the case. The Athenian’s point is that
how one trains in self-control differs for different ages. For the youth who already have a lot of spirit, they need
calm activities to lower their spirit, and as a result they will be more controlled. Adults, on the other hand, have a
dearth of spirit, and need something to excite them so that their resistance to pleasure is sharpened and does not
wane, and drunkenness does this.
21 The Athenian is consistent in banning wine from the youth, however the particular age at which one is permitted
to drink varies, see Meyer 2015, 287, 326.
22 In this passage the elderly’s sense of shame and temperate disposition prevents them from engaging in virtuous
behavior. This is strange for two reasons: (1) drunkenness is supposed to help one cultivate a sense of shame
and temperance, but the elderly already seem to possess it; (2) moderation and a sense of shame are supposed to
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This is quite serious because musical education forms the basis for developing proper
evaluative judgments and emotional responses (see 2.673e; Timaeus 47d–e). According
to the Stranger, humans are distinct from other animals to the extent that only humans,
with the help of the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus, are capable of perceiving rhythm
and harmony in song and dance (i. e., chorus) (2.653e–654b, 2.664e–665a). The idea is
that through organized and systematic singing and dancing at festivals, the rambunctious
movements of children become ne and harmonious, and from this, children learn to take
pleasure in what is ne and good and to hate and be pained by what is ugly and bad
(2.653b–654d; see also 3.689a–e).23 In other words, musical education forms the basis for
citizens’ ethical development because it is through musical education that citizens develop
correct opinions and feelings about what is good and bad (see also Republic 3.401d–402b;
Baima 2017).
We have the beginning of explanation for why the Athenian believes that the elderly
should engage in drunkenness and why the young should abstain from intoxication. Be-
cause the young already have ery dispositions and are eager to participate in song and
dance, they are already primed to be educated into what is ne and good through musical
education. However, this is not the case for older adults since they nd such activities
shameful. Because adults no longer participate in chorus, their musical training tends ‘to
slacken’ and become ‘corrupted to a great extent’ (2.653c7-9). Evidence of this is reected
in the fact that they no longer recognize good choral dances and songs as ne and plea-
surable, but take them to be shameful (2.665d–e). Drunkenness can cure this ailment by
putting adults in a childlike condition, a state in which they lack self-control, are more
excitable, more eager to sing and dance, and able to be reeducated:
As a man approaches forty he is to share in the enjoyment of the common meals, invoking the
presence of the other gods, and especially Dionysus, at this mystery-rite and play of older men,
which he has bestowed on human beings as a drug that heals the austerity (aŒsthrÏthtoc) of old
age. Its effect is that we are rejuvenated (Çnhbên), and the soul, by forgetting its despondency
of spirit (dusjum–ac), has its dispositions turned from harder to softer, so that it becomes more
malleable, like iron when it is plunged into re. First, then, if each man were so disposed, wouldn’t
he become more eager (projumÏterÏn) and less ashamed (©tton a squnÏmenoc) to sing chants (as
we have often called them), in the presence, not of a large company of strangers, but of a small
number of intimate friends? (2.666b2-c8).
Adults who are normally reluctant to sing and dance, will be more eager to participate in
the chorus when intoxicated. Now, since a wise symposiarch will govern their drunken
behavior, he will ensure that the songs and dances they perform are noble:
be benecial dispositions (2.661d–662a; Gorgias 474c–475e), but here they seem to be hindrances (Charmides
157d–161a). One might respond that the elderly’s temperance does not benet them in this situation because they
do not have full temperance – that is temperance with wisdom (see 3.689a–e, 4.709e–710a; cf. Meno 88a–b;
Phaedo 82a ff.). But this only seems to lead to other questions: For instance, how is a lack of wisdom preventing
the elderly from dancing? And, how will getting drunk make them wise? I do not have room in this paper to
explore these interesting questions.
23 The third chorus, which is called the Chorus of the Elders, and referred to as a Chorus of Dionysus, is responsible
for selecting the songs and dances in the festivals (2. 664b–665d, 2.670a–671a.). Morrow (1960, 315) notes that
‘to call this chorus of elders a chorus of Dionysus is a paradox. Dionysus, the giver of wine and the leader in
frenzied dances, was a powerful god among the multitude, but scarcely the god one would choose as patron of an
Academy of taste and morals’; see Belore 1986, 425–7.
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Anyone who participates in such a gathering loosens up and becomes merry . . . Didn’t we say
that when this happens the souls of the drinkers are like iron in re. They become softer and
more youthful, so that they can easily be led – as they were when they were young – by someone
who possesses the ability and the skill to educate and mold souls? The one who molds them, the
same as before, is the good legislator. He must lay down symposium laws. These are laws that
can take in hand that cheerful drinker – who is emboldened, more shameless than he should be
(ÇnaisquntÏteron to‹ dËontoc), and unwilling to abide by the order of taking turns at listening,
speaking, drinking, and singing – and make him do just the opposite. Against this shameful
boldness (e siÏnti tƒ mò kalƒ jàrrei) that is lling him they can send in the nest opponent:
fear with justice. This is the divine fear that we called “modesty” and “shame” (a d¿ te ka»
a sq‘nhn) (2.671b2-d3; see Morrow 1960, 315; cf. Republic 3.411a–b).
Thus, a properly supervised symposium can redevelop the elderly’s evaluative judgments
and affective states by getting them to engage in chorus – an activity, which when sober,
they nd embarrassing.
Now that the general idea is clear, let us look at the causal process in more detail. Let us
start by reviewing the difculties associated with aging. Old age, according to Plato, tends
to make one crabby and despondent (2.666b–c). Because of this, the elderly do not nd
pleasure in participating in chorus; in fact, they nd the activity to be shameful (2.665d–e).
This is evidence that the elderly have a defective character to the extent that they no longer
nd pleasure in something good (see 2.653b–654d; 2.656a). The fact that they take a good
activity to be shameful shows that their sense of shame is off-kilter.24 Furthermore, this is
predictive of a future bad character state: because musical education is the foundation for
one’s ethical development, if one no longer practices musical training, one’s character will
worsen (2.653b–654d).
Wine can help the elderly overcome the difculties associated with austerity and de-
spondency because it makes experiences more pleasurable, it intensies the erotic and
spirited passions, and it lowers one’s self-control (1.645d–e, 2.671b–d). This is why the
Athenian describes wine as putting re in the soul (2.666b–c, 2.671b–d; see also Timaeus
60a). This state has two important effects: (1) it makes one more eager to sing and dance
and (2) it makes one’s character more malleable, such that musical training can improve it.
The connection between (1) and (2) is clear from 2.671b–c. As Susan Meyer (2015, 327;
see also 214–5) points out, earlier passages of the Laws describe the youthful soul as being
pliable (2.664b) and ery (2.666a), but 2.671b–c connects the two, such that ‘the condition
of juvenile volatility is also a condition of plasticity, and hence of educability.’
In other words, wine cures the austerity of old age through allopathic catharsis (cf.
Sophist 230b–e; Phaedo 69a–d).25 Allopathic treatment consists in restoring health through
medicine that contains ingredients that are opposite in nature to those that have caused the
24 It seems that there are actually three different ways to understand this: (1) the elderly have too much shame, (2)
the elderly do not have a sense of shame since a sense of shame involves taking pride in things that are good
and being embarrassed by things that are bad, (3) the elderly have misplaced shame. This is an interesting and
important issue, but for the sake of brevity I have assumed the third reading.
25 For a discussion of how Plato’s account of catharsis ts with Ancient medical practice see Belore 1986, 431–
7. Belore argues that Plato’s discussion of catharsis in the Laws greatly inuenced Aristotle’s conception of
catharsis. Nonetheless, catharsis in the Laws is primarily allopathic (cf. Laws 7.790d–e; see also Linforth 1950,
158; Dodds 1951, 231n59), while Aristotle’s conception of catharsis is not obviously allopathic, but might be
homeopathic (Poetics 6.1149b24-8; Politics 8.6.1341b35-7.1342a15; see also Munteanu 2012, app.).
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illness initially. For example, the elderly, who are plagued by a lack of passion, are given
wine to excite their emotions, while the young should not be given wine because they are
already excitable (2.653d–e, 2.664e, 2.666a, 2.671b–c, and 2.672b–d); instead, the young
should be given something that can calm their manic movements.
To summarize, in Laws 2, drunkenness aids the elderly in redeveloping their evaluative
judgments and affective states. Intoxication is able to do this through a complicated causal
process: wine arouses the emotions and lowers inhabitation; in turn, this makes individuals
more eager to participate in chorus and more malleable, so that when they do participate in
chorus it can reshape their character.
4. The Effects of Wine
Having explored Plato’s attitude towards intoxication in both the Republic and the Laws
we are now in a position to assess the similarities and differences. Both texts agree that
one should not be drunk while in a position of responsibility and that it is terrible to be in a
state of permanent intoxication.
There are, however, two main differences. First, in the Republic, intoxication is as-
sociated with softness, laziness, and looseness, while in the Laws it is associated with
vigor, spirit, and energy. Second, intoxication in the Republic negatively affects the soul
by promoting cowardice and intemperance, while in the Laws it can promote the virtues
of courage and temperance. This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind about
intoxication, or, are these difference merely the result of the Laws and the Republic having
different focuses?
There are some obvious differences in focus between the Laws and the Republic. The
Laws is concerned with practical matters and deals with ordinary citizens, while the
Republic is more theoretical and deals with more idealized citizens (see Stalley 1983,
chap. 2; cf. Bobonich 2002). Scholars generally cite two pieces of evidence to support this
reading. First, in the Laws, unlike in the Republic, one nds detailed discussions of practical
issues. Second, the Stranger refers to the polity of Magnesia as second best (Laws 5.739e4,
9.875d3-4), while in the Republic Socrates makes it clear that he is not concerned about
practical limitations, but is concerned with ideals (Republic 5.472c4-d2). Hence, one might
argue that had Plato been interested in discussing practical matters concerning ordinary
people in the Republic, such as how to deal with old age, his account of drunkenness in
the Republic would be very similar to his account in the Laws.
Nevertheless, this cannot explain why Plato’s description of drunkenness is different. As
I explained above, intoxication in the Laws is associated with youthful energy and intense
passions, while in the Republic it is associated with the languid.26 This difference cannot
26 One might object that this is an exaggeration of the difference between the Laws and the Republic. One might
point to Republic 3.411a–b in which Socrates says that music softens the soul and makes it malleable in the way
that iron is softened and made malleable. One might argue that the repetition of the ‘iron metaphor’ at Laws
2.666b–c and 2.671b–d suggests that Plato has not changed his mind about the effects of intoxication. I have
three responses. First, in the Republic passage it is music that softens the soul, whereas in the Laws it is wine
that softens the soul (see especially 2.671b–c). Second, at Laws 1.645d, Plato describes wine as intensifying the
spirted emotions (toÃc jumoÃc), while the Republic describes it as having the opposite effect. Third, as I explain
below, Aristotle describes Socrates’ view of intoxication as causing weakness.
74 Nicholas R. Baima
be the result of the texts focusing on different citizens because it has to do with the nature
of intoxication itself. Additionally, even though the guardians differ from the citizens of
Magnesia, Plato wants both sets of citizens to be courageous and temperate; thus, it is
telling that the guardians and the citizens of Magnesia train in pleasure in very different
ways. In the Republic, the guardians train in pleasure by not being exposed to gluttony,
lust, and drunkenness. After all, this is why in Books 2, 3, and 10, Socrates bans many of
the traditional stories about gods, heroes, and men. In contrast, the citizens of Magnesia
learn about pleasure by being exposed to vicious behaviors so that they might develop a
resistance to them. For these reasons we must conclude that Plato did in fact change his
mind about intoxication.
Now one might object that in Book 3 of the Republic Plato says that the guardians will
be tested by being exposed to pleasures:
Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they’re afraid, we must expose our young
people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than gold is tested by re. If someone
is hard to put under a spell . . . is a good guardian of himself and the music and poetry he has
learned . . . then he is the best person both for himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in
this way as a child, youth, and adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as
well as a guardian (3.413d8-414a2).
I have three responses to this objection. First, the main focus in the educative process
discussed in Books 2 and 3 is mostly concerned with only exposing the guardians to
virtuous examples – so that they imitate their excellence. Second, it is revealing that
Plato does not include intoxication as a means by which the guardians will be tested in
pleasure (see Republic 2.398e, 3.403e), since in the Laws intoxication is the true test to
see if one is able to resist pleasure. Lastly, this passage demonstrates that the guardians
who are candidates for being philosopher rulers will be exposed to pleasure as means
of training. Nevertheless nothing in the Republic suggests that this training will extend
to other members of the city. Hence, one reason that Socrates might not want to expose
the other citizens to such pleasures is that he thinks it is obvious that it will harm them.
However, in the Laws, all adult citizens will be exposed to pleasures as means of training,
because the Athenian believes that it will help them develop virtue, which suggests that
Plato has changed his mind about this issue.
If I am right about this, we are left with the following questions: Why did Plato change
his mind about the effects of intoxication? And, why did he change his view about the role
of drunkenness in education? I will rst offer an answer to the former question, then I will
consider and reject Elizabeth Belore’s answer to the latter question.
Aristotle’s Politics offers as clue as to why Plato might have changed his mind about
the effects of intoxication. In the Politics Aristotle mentions that certain musical critics
disapproved of Socrates’ rejection of relaxed harmonies (cf. Republic 3.398e):
But even these [principles] are relative to age; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very
well sing the high-strung harmonies, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs should
be of the more relaxed kind. That is why the musicians too blame Socrates, and with justice, for
rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the
ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to make men frenzied revelers (bakqeutik‰n)),
but because they have no strength in them. (8.7.1342b19-27)
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George Grote suggests that this criticism might be why Plato changed his perspective on
the effects of intoxication in the Laws.
[The musical critics] afrmed that drunkenness was exciting and stimulating, – not relaxing nor
favourable to languor and heaviness: that the effeminate musical modes were not congenial to
drunkenness. When we read the Treatise De Legibus, we observe that Plato altered his opinion
respecting mËjh, and had come round to agree with these musical critics. He treats mËjh as exciting
and stimulating, not relaxing and indolent; he even applies it as a positive stimulus to wind up the
Elders. (2010, 328n1)
I think Grote’s suggestion might be the best answer that we can nd.27 Thus, let us turn
towards the question: Why did Plato change his mind about the role of intoxication in
education?
5. Virtue, Health, and Training
Elizabeth Belore (1986) argues that Plato’s discussion of intoxication in the Laws reveals
that Plato is offering a novel account of what constitutes a virtuous soul. In order to un-
derstand Belore’s position, we must rst consider her interpretation of the Republic.28
At Republic 8.558d–559d and 9.571a–572b, Plato distinguishes between necessary and
unnecessary appetites.29 Necessary appetites are those that are benecial; these include
things like the desire for food and water. Reason sanctions the fulllment and pursuit of
these appetites because they are required for continuous ourishing while embodied. In
contrast, unnecessary appetites are those that are not required for continuous ourishing,
such as the desire for gluttony, erotic lust, or extreme wealth. The pursuit of these unnec-
essary appetites is harmful to both the soul and the body, and because of this, reason does
not sanction the pursuit and satisfaction of unnecessary appetites; in other words, they are
anti-rational. Let us turn towards two examples of this.
In Book 4, Plato warns that reason must control the appetitive elements in the soul. For if
reason is lax, the appetitive elements will grow ‘big and strong’ and ‘attempt to enslave and
rule’ reason (4.442a7-b2). The point is that we should pursue only those desires sanctioned
by reason, because if we pursue anti-rational desires, these vicious elements will become
more powerful and seek to rule our soul.
In Book 6, Plato illustrates what he has in mind with a ‘channeled stream’ metaphor.
Plato explains that ‘whenever someone’s desires incline strongly towards some one thing,
they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another
channel’ (6.485d6-8). For instance, if your desires are taught to ow into the channel of
learning, your desires for bodily pleasure will weaken (6.485d). Or conversely, if your
desires are trained to ow to the channel of bodily pleasure, your desires for learning
27 Lord (1982, 215–19) has challenged the authenticity of this passage of Aristotle. Nevertheless, since there does
not seem to be any other explanations available, we must, tentatively, accept Grote’s suggestion.
28 Belore (1986) notes that her account makes heavy use of Cooper 1999, Gosling and Taylor 1982, 97–128, and
Annas 1981, 128–52.
29 The distinction is actually between necessary appetites, unnecessary and lawful appetites, and unnecessary and
lawless appetites. However, the division between lawful unnecessary appetites and lawless unnecessary appetites
is not important for the purposes of this paper.
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will weaken. Belore (1986, p. 423) suggests that the metaphor ‘implies that just as any
diversion of water into one channel deepens that channel, and thus increases the tendency
of a stream to ow in that direction, so even a temporary yielding to a particular kind of
desire strengthens that desire permanently and weakens opposing desires.’
Within the channeled stream metaphor we nd two broad commitments about psychic
health.
Psychic Health in the Republic
a) Harmony Condition: Health and virtue are a kind of harmony or lack of strife in the
soul.
b) Rationality Condition: Reason should always be in control of the soul and anti-rational
elements are always harmful.30
The harmony condition and the rationality condition explain why Plato condemns
tragedy and comedy in the Republic (Belore 1986, 244). Plato worries that when you
watch tragedy, the non-reasoning part of your soul takes pleasure in pitying and grieving
with characters who suffer grave misfortunes (10.606a–b). This is dangerous because
‘after feeding fat the emotion of pity it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings’
(10.606b5-8). Comedy and other forms imitative poetry pose the same threat by arousing
anti-rational desire, which ‘nourishes and waters the elements that should be dried up
and makes them rule over us, when they should be ruled, in order that we may be better
and happier men instead of worse and more miserable’ (10.606d4-7; see also 10.604a–d,
10.607d).
According to Belore (1986), in the Laws, Plato rejects both the harmony condition and
the rationality condition insofar as both strife and anti-rational elements are constitutive
to psychic health and virtue (cf. Timaeus 43a–44d). Belore holds that in the Laws a
‘deciency of anti-rational emotion can be as harmful as excess’ (1986, 421). On Belore’s
reading, virtue and psychic health involve there being two different elements – the rational
and anti-rational – warring against each other, with the rational continuously overcoming
and purging the anti-rational. Hence, on Belore’s reading of the Laws we nd two broad
commitments about psychic health:
Psychic Health in the Laws
a) Strife Condition: Strife is intrinsic to health and virtue.
b) Anti-Rationality Condition: Anti-Rational elements are intrinsic to health and virtue.
Belore supports this reading in three main ways. First, she notes that the Athenian
describes the disordered and mad movements of children positively, describing them as
fundamental to musical education:
No creature is born having as much intelligence as it is tting for it to have when it is grown.
In that time in which it has not yet acquired the good sense proper to it, every creature is mad
30 Belore (1986) does not use these terms, but they are implicit in her discussion. This description of psychic
health is not meant to provide a full account; rather, the intent is to highlight two features of it. Further support
for this interpretation is found in two passages. First, in Republic 4, Plato holds that just actions create and sustain
psychological health, while unjust actions produce and sustain psychological disharmony (444d–445b). Second,
in Republic 9, Plato’s account of the tyrant’s soul suggests that vicious thoughts and desires destroy reasonable
thoughts and desires (573a–c).
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(ma–netai) and makes disordered noises, and as soon as it becomes active, it also makes disordered
leaps. Let us remember that we said these are the sources of music and gymnastics (2.672c1-7; cf.
2.653d–e, 2.664e).
Belore (1986, 427) explains, ‘These elements are anti-rational in that they are not in
themselves amenable to reason, but always oppose it. In the Laws, paradoxically, they
contribute to a well-ordered soul by means of their opposition to order and reason.’
Second, Belore (1986, 428) argues that in the Laws strife is fundamental to the virtues
of temperance and courage, while in the Republic these virtues are dened as a harmony,
or an absence of strife. To illustrate this, Belore points to Book 4 of the Republic in which
Socrates describes the common view of temperance as ‘being stronger than oneself’ as
laughable (4.430e11).31 Temperance, according to Socrates, is not battling and winning
over your more primitive desires; rather, temperance involves ‘friendship and harmony of
these parts of the soul, when the ruler and the ruled both agree that reason should rule and
do not ght’ (4.442c10-d1; see also 4.432a).
Belore (1986, 428) argues that this is not the account of virtue in the Laws. She argues
that in the Laws Plato describes temperance as ‘not only as a state of health after sickness
has been cured, but also as a somewhat precarious condition in which there is constant
need for rehabilitation’ (cf. Barker 1960, 343; North 1966, 186–96; and Stalley 1983, 54–
8). Likewise, she points out that the Athenian denes courage as ‘combat against fears and
pains and also against desires and pleasures’ (6.633c8-d3). Belore (1986, 428) argues that
‘only someone who has to struggle continually against pleasure and desire can become
perfect in sōphrosynē, dened not as harmony and agreement but “victory over oneself.”’32
Third, Belore (1986, 428) argues that this account of health is implicit in the hy-
draulic metaphor of Book 6 of the Laws, which differs greatly from the ‘channeled stream’
metaphor of the Republic. At 6.773c, the Athenian explains that citizens should not marry
individuals with similar characteristics, but should seek to marry people with opposite dis-
positions. For instance, the rich should marry the poor, those from powerful families should
marry those from weak families, and those with hasty dispositions (jàttouc) should marry
those with slower dispositions (bradutËrouc) (6.773c). The Stranger illustrates his point
with a metaphor: ‘a city should be impure, just like a wine bowl: the wine, when poured
in, is throbbing with madness, but under the punishment of another, sober god [water], it
forms a noble partnership that creates a good and measured drink (6.773c7-d4).’33 Belore
(1986, 429) argues that the madness of wine and the soberness of water do not coexist
harmoniously in the mixing bowl; rather, they battle against each other – virtue and health
is produced when the madness is successfully combated.
Belore offers an interesting explanation; however, there are ve problems with her
interpretation of the Laws. First and foremost, at 2.682d2-4, the Stranger explicitly states
31 Belore misstates why Socrates nds this laughable. It is laughable because the same thing is both stronger and
weaker than itself. In order to redeem this idea the soul must be divided into parts.
32 Belore (1986, 428n26) points to 1.626e2-6, 1.636a6-b6, and 1.647c7-d8.
33 Plato’s mixing bowl metaphor is closely tied to a traditional myth in which wine, represented by the child
Dionysus, is corrected by water, represented by his nurses, the Nymphs. The best known account of this myth
is Athen. 11.465a: Phanodemus 325 F 12, cited by Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 6. Similar accounts of mixing
wine with water are given by Diodorus Siculus 4.3.4; Dio Chrysostom 32.58; and Rufus of Ephesus in Oeuvres
‘Fragments extraits D’Aétius’ 75.5-8, cited by Pigeaud 1981, 498–9; see Belore 1986, 430–1; Wilson 2003,
chap. 4.
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that it is a mistake to think that a sick body that is purged of disease is superior to a body
that has no need of purgation (see also 2.627e–628d, 2.643b–644b). The Athenian’s point
is clear: the person who exists in perfect harmony and does not require catharsis is superior
to the person who is only healthy after medical purgation. From this, we can be condent
that Plato still maintains the ‘harmony condition’ in the Laws (see Meyer 2015, 161–163).
Belore (1986, p. 428) dismisses this passage arguing that the Laws is concerned with
the ‘second best’ and thus Plato is applying a different standard of health for these less
ideal citizens (see Laws 5.739e4, 9.875d3-4; Republic 5.472.c4-d2). The problem with
this response, however, is that even if Plato thinks that the Laws deals with less than ideal
citizens, it seems strange to think Plato would apply a lower standard of health for these
citizens than he would for ideal citizens. Rather, it seems more reasonable that Plato would
maintain the same standard of health, but would adjust his expectations for whether or not
certain citizens could reach it. After all, in the Republic, Plato does not apply one standard
of health for the philosopher rulers and another standard for the producers. Instead, the
same standard of health applies to both the producers and philosophers.
Second, although it is true that Plato thinks that the manic movements and cries of the
youth are the origins of music and gymnastics (2.672c–d), this does not entail that these
disordered movements are intrinsic to psychic health. The passage, instead, suggests that
these manic feelings are merely instrumental to psychic health because they inspire one to
participate in the city’s songs and dances.
Third, it is not clear that Plato denes the virtues in terms of strife in the Laws. Although
it is true that the Athenian describes courage as ‘combat against fears and pains and also
against desires and pleasures’ (1.633c8-d3), this description is misleading for two reasons.
First, the primary purpose of this passage is to get Clinias and Megillus to recognize that
courage is not only a matter of enduring pain, but also concerns resisting pleasures. The use
of the term ‘combat’ is likely a rhetorical device to get the agreement of the Stranger’s war-
loving friends (see Meyer 2015, 161–3). Second, after this passage the Athenian explains
that courage is a matter of being both fearless of physical pain and death and being fearful
of acting shamelessly (1.647b–c, 1.648b–c, and 1.649b–c). If courage is, in part, a matter
of not fearing physical pain and death, then, strictly speaking, courage is not a matter of
combating the fear of physical pain and death, because the courageous person will not
fear physical pain and death. Likewise, if courage is a matter of not desiring shameful
pleasures then the virtuous agent has nothing to combat against, because the courageous
individual will not desire vicious pleasures – this is what it means to defeat pleasure and
pain (2.647c–d, 2.655e–652a)
Fourth, Belore’s account does not t with Plato’s puppet metaphor. This is damning be-
cause the Athenian introduces the puppet metaphor in Book 1 to explain how drunkenness
affects the soul:
Consider each of us, living beings that we are, to be a divine puppet – whether contrived as a
plaything of theirs or for some serious purpose, we do not know. But this we do know, (i) that these
affections (tÄ pàjh) in us, like cords or strings, which tug at us and oppose each other towards
opposite actions across the boundary where virtue is distinguished from vice. Now, as our account
holds, (ii) each person should always follow one of these cords, never letting go of it and (iii) pull
against the other cords: this is the golden and sacred pull of calculation, called the common law
of the city. The other cords are hard and iron and resemble a variety of things, while this one is
soft since it is of gold. (iv) With the nest pull of the law we should always cooperate; for since
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calculation is noble, but gentle rather than forceful, its pull needs helpers to assure that the golden
kind within us may always (v) conquer the other kinds (1.644d7-645b1, my emphasis).
Although (i), (iii), and (v), make it clear that Plato thinks that the affections war against each
other – pulling and pushing towards opposite actions – towards virtue and vice, nothing
in this description suggests that this combat is fundamental to virtue. If anything, (ii) and
(iv) suggest that strife is not intrinsic to virtue, but actually threatens it. Additionally, (ii),
(iv), and (v), indicate that reason should always be ruling in the soul (see Meyer 2015,
161–163).
The fth problem is that Belore’s account neglects the role that the symposiarch plays
in the symposium. Drunkenness arouses passions and temporally weakens self-control,
but it does this under the supervision of a wise, sober, and self-controlled leader. It is
true that from the internal perspective of the drunkard, the control of reason surrenders to
the madness of wine; nonetheless, from the external perspective, reason still rules insofar
as the wise symposiarch is governing the symposium. For these reasons, we must reject
Belore’s claim that the anti-rational elements and strife are intrinsic to health in the Laws.
From this objection, we can infer that Plato maintains that from an external perspective,
reason must always be in control.
Although Belore’s account of the Laws is mistaken, I agree with her that in the Republic
anti-rational desires are permanently damaging to the soul, while in the Laws they are not.
However, it is a mistake to conclude from this that Plato changed his mind about what
constitutes health and virtue. Instead, what we should conclude from this is that Plato
altered his view about how to bring about and sustain health and virtue. In the Laws, anti-
rational desires can aid the development of health and virtue, while in the Republic, they
cannot.34 More precisely, in the Laws we nd the following account of psychic health:
Revised Account of Psychic Health in the Laws
a) Harmony Condition: Health and virtue are a kind of harmony or lack of strife in the
soul.
b) External Rationality Condition: Externally, reason should always be in control of the
soul.
c) Internal Anti-Rationality Condition: Internally, anti-rational desires can be instrumental
to health.
Plato’s adoption of the ‘internal anti-rational condition’ in the Laws and his rejection of it
in the Republic explains why Plato would permit intoxication in the Laws, but forbid it in
the Republic.
34 One might object to my interpretation of the Republic by pointing out that Plato maintains that when men and
women are no longer capable of procreation, they are turned loose from the ‘rigged sexual lottery’ and can have
as much sex as they want (5.461b–c). I have two responses: rst, nothing in Socrates’ discussion at 5.461b–c
suggests that there is positive value in the elderly experiencing erotic lust or irrationality. Additionally, if we
take Cephalus’ description of old age as a release and escape from erotic lust – the ‘savage beast of a master’
(1.392c) – seriously, then it is unlikely that Plato anticipates that the elderly have strong sexual desires. After all,
the whole purpose behind giving older adults wine in the Laws is that old age has diminished their erotic and
mad desires. This indicates that the reason Plato turns the elderly loose in the Republic has more to do with Plato
thinking that the elderly will not desire sex than it does with the idea that erotic desires are instrumental to health
and virtue.
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6. Conclusion
In sections one through three, I argued that in the Laws Plato has a more positive attitude
towards intoxication than he does in the Republic. In section four, I argued that this is not
merely the result of textual differences between the Republic and the Laws, but marks a
substantive shift in Plato’s view of intoxication and virtue. In section ve, I considered
and rejected Elizabeth Belore’s explanation that strife and the anti-rational elements are
intrinsic to health and virtue in the Laws but are always damning in the Republic. I argued
that Belore’s account of the Republic is correct, but her account of the Laws is mistaken –
the passages on drunkenness in the Laws only support the weaker claim that the anti-
rational elements are instrumental to health and virtue.35
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